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CIVIL RELIGION AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY
DAVID A.J. RICHARDS*
Sanford Levinson conceives the American commitment to con-
stitutional law as our civil religion,' and asks whether or why we
should-in this bicentennial year-sign onto the Constitution, as
amended. In these remarks, I take objection to the way in which
Levinson poses the question of constitutional legitimacy, although
I sympathize with the personal and political motives that underlie
his rather tortured struggle toward constitutional legitimacy as a
regulative ideal of much of the most principled political discussion
that still exists in this country. My objection focuses on Levinson's
conception of civil religion as the best interpretation of the Ameri-
can constitutional tradition and our relationship to it.
Initially, there are intractable interpretive problems with under-
standing the Founding itself as a specifically religious-as opposed
to a social or economic or politically constitutive-moment. As
Levinson acknowledges,2 the text of the Constitution, in contrast
to some of the state constitutions (which the Founders quite
clearly had in mind as comparative "experimental ' 3 benchmarks4 ),
is a studiously secular document. Its grand opening invokes not
* Professor of Law, New York University. A.B., Harvard University, 1966; D. Phil., Ox-
ford University, 1970; Member, New York Bar. The author acknowledges with thanks a
generous research grant from the New York University School of Law Filomen D'Agostino
and Max E. Greenberg Faculty Research Fund.
1. Levinson, Pledging Faith in the Civil Religion; Or, Would You Sign the Constitution?,
29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 113 (1987).
2. Id.
3. For example, at the Virginia ratification convention, Madison observed: "I can see no
danger in submitting to practice an experiment which seems to be founded on the best
theoretic principles." 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 394 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1836). At the South Carolina Conven-
tion, Charles Pinckney admitted that "[o]ur Constitution was in some measure an experi-
ment," and that he "considered it the fairest experiment ever made in favor of human na-
ture." 4 id. at 262. On the pervasive background literature that shaped these experimental
attitudes, see H. COLBOURN, THE LAMP OF EXPERIENCE (1965).
4. See generally W. ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY
AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA (R. Kimber and
R. Kimber trans. 1980).
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God, but "We, the people," 5 article VI quite clearly forbids any
religious qualifications whatsoever on federal office,6 and the Bill of
Rights contains the most radical constitutional separation of secu-
lar and religious authority yet innovated by the mind of man."
Moreover, the dominant political philosophy of the American con-
stitutional constructivists-at both state and federal levels-was
remorselessly secular and empirical in the spirit of the political sci-
ence of Harrington,' Montesquieu, 9 and Hume.10 There is an ex-
traordinary spirit of chastened empiricism in the deepest American
constitutional thinkers of the period-for example, John Adams of
Massachusetts and James Madison of Virginia. Adams thus
opened his great Defence of the Constitutions of the United
States by characterizing the work of the American constitutional
constructivists as follows:
It will never be pretended that any persons employed in that
service had ... interviews with the gods, or were in any degree
under the inspiration of heaven, any more than those at work
upon ships or houses, or labouring in merchandize or agricul-
ture: it will for ever be acknowledged that these governments
were contrived merely by the use of reason and the senses. As
Copley painted Chatham,... as Godrey invented his quadrant,
and Rittenhouse his planetarium; as Boylston practised inocula-
tion, and Franklin electricity .... 11
And Madison-although he probably rejected Hume's religious
skepticism and certainly rejected his attacks on Lockean con-
5. U.S. CONST. preamble.
6. Id. at art. VI.
7. Id. at amend. I.
8. See J. HARRINGTON, OCEANA (Hyperion reprint ed. 1979) (based on 1924 reprint of 1656
original). For lucid commentary, see Z. FALK, THE CLASSICAL REPUBLICANS 52-89 (1945).
9. See B. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (T. Nugent trans.) (J. Pritchard 2d ed. 1897)
(1st ed. 1748). For commentary, see T. PANGLE, MONTESQUIEU'S PHILOSOPHY OF LIBERALISM
(1973).
10. See, e.g., D. HUME, That Politics May be Reduced to a Science, in ESSAYS: MORAL,
POLITICAL AND LITERARY 13-28 (Oxford ed. 1963) [hereinafter ESSAYS]. For commentary, see
D. ADAIR, FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 93-106 (1974); D. FORBES, HUME'S PHILOSOPHI-
CAL POLITICS (1975); D. MILLER, PHILOSOPHY AND IDEOLOGY IN HUME'S POLITICAL THOUGHT
(1981).
11. J. ADAMS, 1 DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES XVi (London 1787-
1788).
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tractarianism and inalienable natural rightsl2-notoriously fol-
lowed Hume' s and Harrington 4 in regarding religion itself as yet
another locus of faction,15 the corruptive tendency of groups to de-
grade and diminish the interests and rights of outsiders to the
group,16 and argued for corresponding constitutional constraints on
its force-both the procedural constraints of federalism 1" and sepa-
ration of powers'" and the substantive constraints of the religion
clauses of the first amendment. 9
Indeed, the antiestablishment and free exercise clauses of the
first amendment are, in my judgment, best read interpretively as a
novel experiment in the construction of the republican public mo-
rality required to sustain an enduring republican polity.20 That ex-
periment was a repudiation of the alternative Erastian conception
of civil religion familiar to the Founders in the classical republican
tradition elaborated by Machiavelli 2' and Rousseau.22 The chal-
lenge to all republican theorists after the ancient world was to un-
derstand whether and how republican political practice could exist
in a nonpagan world; in particular, in the world of commitment to
the Judaeo-Christian religion synthesis. After all, the great histori-
cal examples of republican rule-Athens, Sparta, Rome, Carthage,
and the like-were all pre-Christian or pagan societies, and the
12. See, e.g., J. MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance, in TiE MIND OF THE FOUNDER 6-
13 (M. Myers ed. 1981).
13. See D. HUME, Of Parties in General, in ESSAYS, supra note 10, at 54-62.
14. See J. HARRINGTON, supra note 8, at 55.
15. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 79, 84 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). On Hume's
influence on Madison, see D. ADAIR, supra note 10, at 93-123. For penetrating recent com-
mentary on the argument of THE FEDERALIST, see M. WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST,
AND THE CONSTITUTION (1987).
16. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
17. See THEFEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
18. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (A. Hamilton or J. Madison).
19. See U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1-2. See also T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH
AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 134-48 (1986).
20. For a more expanded exploration of these themes, see D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND
THE CONSTITUTION 95, 97-98, 235-39, 244-47 (1986). For a more recent investigation along the
specific lines suggested here, see Richards, Religion, Public Morality, and Constitutional
Law, in NoMos: RELIGION, MORALITY, AND THE LAW (forthcoming).
21. See N. MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE AND DISCOURSES 145-60 (M. Lerner ed. 1950) (1st ed.
1513).
22. See J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 129-41 (G. Cole trans. 1950)
(1st ed. 1762).
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reawakening of interest in republican theory and practice in the
Renaissance naturally posed the question whether and how repub-
licanism could be squared with Christian commitments.
The classical republican answer by Machiavelli, Rousseau, and
Marx23 was, I believe, the Erastian conception of civil religion, an
established church controlled by state power to appropriately
emancipatory ends. On this analysis, the great defect in the rela-
tionship of church and state since Constantine was the indepen-
dence of the church from state control, and its consequent capacity
to corrupt republican aims and values by theocratically defined
ends. This view is naturally, although not inevitably, linked to the
kind of anticlericalism familiar to Europeans from republican Ven-
ice and Florence and the associated classical republican tradition
revived by Machiavelli. 4 On this view, Judaeo-Christian values,
whatever their truth value, are intrinsically dangerous, and must
be cabined and tamed to the ends of secular authority by the as-
sertion of supreme secular authority over religious life on the
model of Roman or Spartan civil religion.
The religion clauses of the first amendment rest, I believe, on a
different analysis of how Judaeo-Christian belief and republican
values interconnect. On this view, reflected in the classical writings
on toleration of Pierre Bayle25 and John Locke,2 6 the essential
moral message of Christian belief-namely, the democratic liberty
and equality of all persons-was profoundly supportive of republi-
can values of equal liberty under law, but had been corrupted from
its proper supportive role by Constantine's wholly heretical and
blasphemous establishment of Christianity as the church of the
Roman Empire.27 The problem was not that Constantine had
opted for the wrong form of established church-one subordinat-
23. See K. MARX, On the Jewish Question, in KARL MARX: EARLY WRITINGS 1-40 (T. Bot-
tomore trans. 1962) (1st ed. 1843).
24. See W. BOUWSMA, VENICE AND THE DEFENSE OF REPUBLICAN LIBERTY 1-51, 417-638
(1968).
25. 2 P. BAYLE, Philosophique Commentaire sur ces parole de Jesus Christ "Contrain-les
d'entree,"OEUvREs DIVRSES DE MR. PIERRE BAYLE 337-560 (1727).
26. J. LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, A Second Letter Concerning Toleration, A
Third Letter for Toleration, A Fourth Letter for Toleration, in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN
LOCKE 1-574 (1823).
27. For a further elaboration of this argument at some length, see D. RICHARDS, supra
note 20, at 89-102.
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ing secular to religious authority-but that he had wedded reli-
gious to secular authority at all. Locke accordingly argued for the
limitation of state power to secular ends not primarily because of
any anticlerical or antireligious commitment to secularism as
such-of the sort one finds, I think, in Machiavelli, Voltaire, and
MarxSS-but in order to preserve the essential emancipatory moral
truths of Christian belief-namely, democratic equality under
law-from their corruption by secular incentives.2 9 For Locke, as
for Roger Williams, 0 Isaac Backus, 31 Thomas Jefferson,32 and
James Madison,3" the consequences of the failure thus to separate
secular and religious authority had been the devastating historical
fact that historical Christianity since Constantine had been a cru-
cial support of the profoundly unjust forms of feudal and absolute
monarchies that had been the governing political norm in the West
since the fall of the Roman Empire. 4 Jefferson and Madison ac-
cordingly innovated the American antiestablishment tradition3 5 as
an expression of the familiar American union of equally intense
personal religiosity and republicanism: the discourse of political
life must be limited to the general goods of life, liberty, and prop-
28. See N. MACHIAVELLI, supra note 21, at 149-53; K. MARX, supra note 23, at 9-17; F.
VOLTAIRE, PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARY 485-89 (P. Gay trans. 1962) (1st ed. 1764).
29. See J. LOCKE, supra note 26, at 1-58.
30. See R. WILLIAMS, The Bloody Tenent of Persecution, in 3 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF
ROGER WILLIAMS (S. Caldwell ed. 1963).
31. See ISAAC BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE AND CALVINISM: PAMPHLETS, 1754-1789 (W. Mc-
Loughlin ed. 1968).
32. See T. JEFFERSON, Virginia Bill for Religious Freedom, in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, 1777-1779, at 545 (J. Boyd ed. 1950).
33. See J. MADISON, supra note 12, at 5-13.
34. Thomas Jefferson, author of the Virginia Bill for Religious Freedom, argued this way
under the influence of both Kames and Bolingbroke. See H. KAMES, ESSAYS ON THE PRINCI-
PLES OF MORALITY AND NATURAL RELIGION 136-49 (R. Wellek ed. 1976); L. BOLINGBROKE, 3
THE WORKS OF LORD BOLINGBROKE 373-525 (F. Cass ed. 1967). In effect, the history of Au-
gustinian intolerance in the West had corrupted Western ethics, including a proper under-
standing of the ethics of the Gospels, by speculative theology. See A. KOCH, THE PHILOSOPHY
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 9-39 (1957). On Augustinian intolerance, see D. RICHARDS, supra note
20, at 86-88. For Jefferson's own linkage of religious persecution with moral and religious
corruption, see the preface to his Bill for Religious Freedom, T. JEFFERSON, supra note 32,
at 545-46. In his later life, Jefferson subscribed to Joseph Preistley's views on the corruption
of true Christianity. See generally T. JEFFERSON, JEFFERSON'S EXTRACTS FROM THE GOSPELS
14-40 (D. Adams ed. 1983). Jefferson's own attempts at Bible criticism were actuated by his
desire to distinguish the gold from the dross.
35. See D. RICHARDS, supra note 20, at 111-16.
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erty that all persons (of diverse religious and philosophical per-
spectives) could agree on, not because those goods define the ulti-
mate meaning of life, but precisely because they do not. That is,
they are neutral resources that persons, on terms of democratic
equality, may develop in pluralistically incommensurable ways in
pursuit of personal visions of ultimate religious or philosophical
value in living.38 In short, the limitation of state power to secular
ends and the harms defined by the frustration of those ends3 7 pre-
served the democratic equal liberty essential to republican politics,
true ethics, and pure religion.
For these reasons, Levinson's conception of civil religion, which
ill fits all these features of the 1787 Founding, does not do justice
to the central fact of the American constitutional consciousness:
the distinctive authority claimed by the 1787 Constitution, as
amended. That authority is self-consciously not a religious author-
ity, although it is, of course, influenced by the models of religious
authority-in particular, covenant theology 3 -that shaped the
American moral and political mind. Our continuing commitment
to its authority is not well explained by acts of constitutional faith,
of the sort that Levinson's account calls for. Indeed, the Founders
of the United States Constitution precisely would not have re-
garded an act of faith as, in principle, an object of legitimate state
authority, for if only faith could mediate assent to the American
Constitution, we lack precisely the kind of egalitarian appeal to
secular reason on which our constructivist Founders so brilliantly
insisted in, for example, the Federalist papers" as the ground for
the legitimacy of the Constitution. For the same reason, our con-
tinuing commitment to the authority of their great work, as
amended, should not and does not require acts of faith. It requires
36. See id. at 118-21.
37. Both Locke and Jefferson quite clearly state the harm principle. See J. LOCKE, supra
note 26, at 34, 36-37, 40, 51; T. JEFFERSON, Notes on the State of Virginia, in THOMAS JEF-
FERSON: WRITINGS (Library of America 1984). "The legitimate powers of government extend
to such acts only as are injurious to others. But it does me no injury for my neighbour to say
there are twenty gods, or no god. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg." Id. at 285.
38. See A. McLAUGHLIN, THE FOUNDATION OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 3-29, 63-84
(1932); D. RICHARDS, supra note 20, at 52-63, 104-10.
39. See A. FURTWANGLER, THE AUTHORITY OF PUBLIUS (1984).
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instead the same kind of egalitarian justification of state power to
the constitutional community of principle over time.40
This approach to constitutional legitimacy looks in a quite dif-
ferent direction from Levinson's fideistic pledge of allegiance. We
look not to faith, but to a complex interpretive inquiry into how
and why the continuing authority of the Constitution, as amended,
turns on highly abstract interpretive arguments of principle that
impute to the text the kind of egalitarian justifiability that a re-
publican community of free and equal persons requires as the jus-
tification of state power. I cannot here investigate these themes as
fully as they require.41 It suffices, for present critical purposes, to
note that the investigation is crucially an engaged interpretive one
in which one comes to understand that our most authoritative
practices of constitutional interpretation are driven by the kinds of
arguments of egalitarian justifiability that are familiar in our con-
stitutional culture from 1787. We impute to the text connotative
over denotative meaning, and reach for higher levels of abstract
connotative meaning, because such interpretive practices better
justify the Constitution on the terms of egalitarian secular reason,
which is the foundation of constitutional legitimacy.
I see very little difficulty in this approach for the kinds of consti-
tutional allegiance problems that Levinson invokes; namely, the le-
gitimation of slavery by the 1787 Constitution and the trivializa-
tion of constitutional commitment by Schneiderman v. United
States.42 The sense that slavery was severely in tension with much
else in the constitutional design existed, of course, from the begin-
ning.43 Slavery was blatantly inconsistent, as abolitionists were to
note in the nineteenth-century debates, with the motivating politi-
cal philosophy of natural rights of the American democratic experi-
40. I develop this thought at greater length in Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and
Constitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 800 (1986). See also R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE
(1986).
41. See Richards, supra note 40.
42. 320 U.S. 118 (1943). See Levinson, supra note 1.
43. At the Constitutional Convention, for example, Madison observed that mentioning
the slave trade in the Constitution "will be more dishonorable to the National character
than to say nothing about it in the Constitution." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEN-
TION OF 1787, at 415 (M. Farrand ed. 1911).
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ments. 4 Certainly, the Reconstruction amendments elaborate
standing constitutional principles in a more principled way than
the 1787 Constitution, and may themselves therefore be regarded
as an interpretive as much as an innovative fact. And the exclusion
of Marxists from citizenship is surely not so much a trivialization
of constitutional allegiance as the principled elaboration of the
kind of constitutional commitment to equal liberty that drove Jef-
ferson and Madison to tolerate the intolerant, including Catholics
and atheists, both of whom Locke excluded from the scope of uni-
versal toleration.45 The arguments of political exclusion in
Schneiderman are, I believe, the twentieth-century versions of the
comparable arguments used against the subversives of seven-
teenth- and eighteenth-century thought, arguments clearly rejected
by Madison and Jefferson and comparably worthy of rejection to-
day on the same grounds of basic constitutional principle."'
I have objected to Levinson's interconnected accounts of civil re-
ligion and constitutional legitimacy largely on interpretive
grounds, but for me another ground for larger political worry is in
his approach to these matters. Specifically, Levinson's leap of faith
in the Constitution comes too easily. It occurs at the end of a
largely skeptical essay, posing various reasons to doubt that the
Constitution is worthy of an egalitarian liberal's signature today.
His skepticism then ends in a leap of animal faith in the basic po-
litical decency of the constitutional design. But he has not given us
good reasons for his Kierkegaardian leap, which, of course, sub-
verts the rationality and internal coherence of his entire project.
This leap of faith also suggests a malign danger in Levinson's
approach, a too-easy readiness to acquiesce in the surely suspect
proposition that the American constitutional tradition is isomor-
phic with all the claims of the best contemporary theories of liberal
egalitarian political, social, and economic justice. I, for one, doubt
that proposition very much indeed, although I am open to argu-
ment on the point. I believe, for example, that something like
44. This philosophy was stated, for example, in the Declaration of Independence. See
generally R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975).
45. For Locke's exclusions, see J. LOCKE, supra note 26, at 45-47 (Catholics), 47 (atheists).
For commentary on Jefferson's rejection of these exclusions, see D. RICHARDS, supra note 20,
at 112.
46. I develop this argument at greater length in D. RICHARDS, supra note 20, at 178-87.
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Rawls's difference principle, suitably interpreted, is probably the
best theory of economic justice currently available, 7 and it is the
one that informs my own commitments on a large range of ques-
tions of domestic and international distributive justice.4 8 I am not
at all clear, however, that this theory of economic and social justice
uniquely fits the American constitutional tradition. I can under-
stand, although I cannot subscribe to, the interpretive sense of
constitutional theorists like Epstein 9 who believe that this and
other less demanding theories of redistributive justice are, in fact,
inconsistent with the Constitution.
Constitutional law and political morality, although often comple-
mentary, are sometimes in tension, and I think it may be very im-
portant to the progress of our political morality as a people that
the tension not be too easily and uncritically relieved. Levinson's
approach exemplifies these difficulties: he combines liberal skepti-
cism about the Constitution with an ultimately fideistic allegiance
to the Constitution's basic liberal decency. He thus fails to explain
adequately why, in fact, much constitutional law is a profoundly
legitimate interpretation of political liberalism as a distinctive po-
litical theory, nor has he focused our attention on its limits as a
vehicle of liberal justice.
That is the price we pay for the constitutional romanticism of
Levinson's skepticism and animal faith, a romanticism far from the
world of the Founders. The Constitution, I believe, was written in
a different style. It is closer to the classicism of Haydn than the
agonies of Mahler. We need, both interpretively and critically, to
recapture that world, to understand our liberal roots not in the
false community of civil religion, but in one of human history's
great constructivist achievements of secular reason.
47. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 75-108, 258-332 (1971).
48. See D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION 106-47 (1971).
49. See R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985).
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